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A hedge fund is a privately offered investment vehicle that pools the contributions of investors in order to 
invest in a variety of assets, such as securities, futures, options, bonds and currencies. Hedge funds have 
attracted growing attention from policy makers, ﬁ  nancial market participants and the general public due to 
their rapid growth and substantial scale, their importance to banks as clients and the impact of their trading 
activity on global capital markets. Because of their rapid growth and the market disruptions caused by 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, some analysts believe that hedge funds pose systemic 
risks. However, this is unlikely. A thorough review of the avenues through which hedge funds could cause 
systemic problems indicates that, although a major disruption emanating from the hedge fund sector is 
possible, it would be difﬁ  cult for the sector to be highly disruptive to ﬁ  nancial markets. Post-LTCM, regulatory 
authorities have encouraged banks to monitor their hedge fund clients through constraints on their leverage. 
This has thus far proven effective, as the recent failure of Amaranth demonstrates. That failure, the largest 
yet, caused hardly a ripple in the wider ﬁ  nancial markets.  
Hedge funds support the robustness of markets in many ways. They provide attractive investment alternatives 
and improve economy-wide risk sharing. In addition, they promote ﬁ  nancial market stability by assuming 
risks that other market participants are unwilling or unable to bear; by providing liquidity; and by placing 
trades that move mispriced assets toward their “fundamental” values. Of course, hedge funds could raise 
problems through their dominant role in some markets, active trading strategies, use of leverage and relative 
lack of transparency. Counterparties must therefore be cognizant of the risks they bear from hedge funds. 
Also, regulators must continue to promote better hedge fund risk management and transparency through 
their regulation of counterparties while remaining vigilant about potential systemic risks emanating from 
the sector. On balance, however, hedge funds enhance market stability and are unlikely to be the source 
of a systemic failure.
NB: The authors thank R. Sbaschnig for research support on this article.ARTICLES
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I| SIZE OF HEDGE FUNDS
The hedge fund industry has grown rapidly in 
recent years. According to estimates by Hedge 
Fund Research (HFR), the industry grew from 
610 funds managing USD 39 billion of assets in 1990 
to 3,873 funds with USD 490 billion ten years 
later (Chart 1). As of the end of the third quarter
of 2006, 9,228 funds managed some USD 1.4 trillion, 
representing annualized asset growth of 19% 
since 2000. More than USD 1 trillion of these assets 
are in the US, USD 325 billion are managed in Europe
and USD 115 billion in Asia.1
As the industry has grown, so too have the number 
of extremely large funds. At year-end 2002, the 
largest hedge fund, Moore Capital, had USD 8 billion 
in assets. Just three years later, 31 funds managed 
this much in assets and Moore, whose assets had 
grown to USD 10.2 billion, was not even among the 
ten largest (Table 1). In recent years, the industry 
has become more concentrated. The asset share
of the 100 largest hedge fund managers has risen 
from 54% in 2003 to 65% in 2005.2
Although their assets represent little more than 
1% of the total debt and equity outstanding 
worldwide, hedge funds have a signiﬁ  cant impact 
on ﬁ  nancial markets. Because many hedge funds 
trade frequently and employ leverage, they account 
for about 30% of US equity trading volume.3
One hedge fund, SAC Capital, is reported to account 
for as much as 3% of NYSE average daily volume 
and 1% of NASDAQ daily volume.4 In a survey of the 
main London banks that provide prime brokerage 
services to hedge funds, the Financial Services 
Authority found that the funds’ average leverage 
is 2.4:1 (GBP 2.4 in assets per GBP 1 of capital).5
Hedge funds dominate some markets. For example, 
they account for about 70% of the long value in the 
convertibles market.6
Chart 1
Hedge fund assets have been growing rapidly
(USD billions)  (as a % of global debt and equity outstanding)
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Sources: Hedge Fund Research, World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV), Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting.
Table 1
The ten largest hedge fund managers
Year-end 2005
(assets in USD billions)
Fund manager Location Assets
Goldman Sachs Asset Management New York, NY 21.0
Bridgewater Associates Westport, CT 20.9
D.E. Shaw Group New York, NY 19.9
Farallon Capital Management San Francisco, CA 16.4
ESL Investments Greenwich, CT 15.0
Barclays Global Investors London, UK 14.3
Och-Ziff Capital Management Group New York, NY 14.3
Man Investments London, UK 12.7
Tudor Investment Group Greenwich, CT 12.7
Caxton Associates New York, NY 12.5
Source: Rose-Smith (I.) (2006): “The hedge fund 100”, Institutional Investor’s 
Alpha, June.
1  Data from Hedge Fund Intelligence, quoted in Mallaby (S.) (2007): “Hands off hedge funds”, Foreign Affairs, January/February.
2  Rose-Smith (I.) (2006): “The hedge fund 100”, Institutional Investor’s Alpha, June.
3 US  Securities  & Exchange Commission, “Testimony concerning the regulation of hedge funds”.
4  Vickers (M.) (2003): “The most powerful trader on Wall Street you’ve never heard of”, Business Week, July 21.
5  Speech by Waters (D.), Director, Asset Management Sector Leader and Director of Retail Policy, Financial Services Authority (FSA), October 19, 2006.
6  Feng (J.), Greenwich Associates (2004): “Hedge fund strategies drive market direction in US and Euro converts”, August 5.ARTICLES
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2| TYPES OF HEDGE FUNDS
The investment styles of hedge funds vary widely. 
The major strategies fall into three general 
categories.
• Market trend/directional strategies take positions 
based on market or security trends.
– Macro funds make directional bets based on 
macroeconomic fundamentals in the equities, 
interest rates, currency and commodities markets.  
– Long/short funds buy securities they believe 
to be underpriced and sell securities they deem 
overpriced.  Unlike mutual funds, these funds 
commonly employ leverage, take short positions 
and use derivatives.  Some of these funds are 
market-neutral (i.e. beta=0); most are net long.
• Event-driven strategies seek to exploit mispricing 
caused by discrete events.
– Distressed securities funds attempt to exploit 
mispricing of securities involved in, or at risk of, 
bankruptcy or reorganization.
– Risk/merger arbitrage funds seek to proﬁ  t 
from trading the stocks of companies involved 
in mergers, takeovers, or buyouts.
• Arbitrage strategies seek to exploit small pricing 
inefﬁ  ciencies between closely-related securities.
– Convertible arbitrage funds generally take 
long positions in a company’s convertible debt, 
preferred stock, or warrants while shorting the 
company’s common stock.
– Fixed-income arbitrage funds seek to exploit 
small pricing inefﬁ   ciencies in similar ﬁ  xed 
income instruments.
– Statistical arbitrage funds uses econometric 
and/or mathematical models to try to ﬁ  nd pricing 
inefﬁ  ciencies.7
More than half of hedge fund assets are 
invested in long/short equity and event driven
strategies (Chart 2). The risk proﬁ  les of hedge funds 
vary widely. Many employ variations or combinations
of basic strategies.
3| BENEFITS OF HEDGE FUNDS
The beneﬁ  ts that hedge funds offer investors are 
well known. Less well understood are the ways that 
hedge funds improve risk sharing and ﬁ  nancial 
market stability.
3|1 Beneﬁ  ts to investors
A well diversiﬁ  ed portfolio of hedge funds appears 
to have the potential to earn attractive returns 
with less risk than equities. In the decade through
year-end 2006, the HFR Fund-Weighted Composite 
Index generated a higher annual return than the 
MSCI-World Equity Index (10.6% versus 8.1%) with 
half of the risk (Chart 3).8 Moreover, the “beta” of 
the HFR with respect to the MSCI-W was 0.4, which 
means that each percentage point change in returns 
Chart 2
Long/short equity funds are the biggest category
Percentage of total hedge fund assets by strategy –
















Note: These categories follow Technical Analysts Society Singapore’s (TASS) 
deﬁ  nitions and do not exactly match the above categories.
Sources: TASS Research, “Commentary on TASS Asset Flows”, 
second quarter 2006; Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting.
7 Deﬁ  nitions based on US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2003): “Implications on the growth of hedge funds”, Staff Report, p. 35-36, September.
8  The standard deviation of monthly returns was 2.1% for the HFR Composite and 4.2% for the MSCI-W.ARTICLES
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to the MSCI-W was typically associated with a 0.4% 
change in the HFR composite’s returns. A low beta 
such as this suggests that allocating some of a portfolio 
to hedge funds in lieu of stocks can potentially reduce 
the volatility of portfolio returns. 
In assessing these beneﬁ  ts, a few caveats are in 
order. First, unlike equity indices such as the MSCI-W
and the S&P 500, for which vehicles exist enabling 
investors to track their returns, there is no way for 
investors to replicate the performance of hedge 
fund indices, since many of the funds in these 
indices are closed to new investors. Second, there 
is considerable evidence that hedge fund indices 
substantially overstate the returns and understate 
the risk of hedge funds.9 Finally, hedge funds are 
far less liquid than equities. 
3|2 Risk  sharing
Smoothly functioning institutions that facilitate risk 
sharing, such as equity, derivatives and insurance 
markets, allow risks to be shifted to the parties most 
willing and best equipped to bear them. This helps 
an economy to function more efﬁ  ciently.
Hedge funds have become an important source
of risk capital. In the ﬂ  edgling  market  for
insurance-linked securities such as catastrophe 
bonds and life bonds, hedge funds have become 
increasingly active investors. Some funds have 
been launched to invest exclusively in insurance 
risk. Over time, hedge funds will become an 
increasingly important ﬁ  nancing source for insurers, 
complementing reinsurance in areas such as peak 
catastrophe risks, for which industry capital is 
insufﬁ  cient. On a larger scale, hedge funds absorb 
credit risks from other ﬁ  nancial  institutions, 
notably banks, thereby distributing these exposures 
across a broader range of investors holding
diversiﬁ  ed portfolios.
3|3  Financial market stability
The improved risk sharing that hedge funds facilitate 
can enhance market stability. By assuming some 
of the escalating volume of credit and catastrophe 
risks in the marketplace alongside banks and 
insurers, hedge funds join other institutions in 
serving as shock absorbers, potentially limiting 
the spread of damage from recessions, credit crises 
and natural catastrophes.
Hedge funds can help improve market stability 
in tumultuous times in other ways as well. When 
liquidity dries up and other market participants 
avoid trading a particular security, hedge funds 
often enter the fray, in areas such as distressed debt. 
Increased trading contributes to market liquidity, 
which causes a reduction in the risk premia 
associated with ﬁ  nancial assets. This ultimately 
means a lower cost of capital.
When the market price of a currency or security 
deviates sharply from its “fundamental” value, hedge 
funds seek opportunities to arbitrage the difference, 
thereby fostering the return of asset prices to their 
“fundamental” values. Hedge funds are uniquely 
able to act in this way because their investors are 
generally subject to “lock-ups”, which require them 
to keep their investments with the fund for a set 
period. Hedge funds also have bank lines of credit 
that they can access when a compelling investment 
opportunity arises.
Chart 3
Cumulative returns to hedge funds and global equities
January 1997-December 2006
(December 1996 = 1.0)
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Sources: Hedge Fund Research, MSCI Barra.
9  This is because of biases in the data sets on which hedge fund indices are based, such as survivorship bias, backﬁ  ll bias and self–selection bias. See, for example,
Malkiel (B.) and Saha (A.) (2005): “Hedge funds: risk and return”, Financial Analysts Journal, November/December, p. 80-88. For evidence that reported hedge fund returns 
understate the correlation of funds with equity markets, see Asness (C.), Krail (R.) and Liew (J.) (2001): “Do hedge funds hedge?”,The Journal of Portfolio Management,
p. 6-19, Fall.ARTICLES
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4| SYSTEMIC RISK ISSUES
Hedge funds, like other ﬁ  nancial institutions, pose 
two types of risk to investors and the ﬁ  nancial 
community at large: systemic and non-systemic.
Systemic risk refers to the risk that one ﬁ  nancial 
institution’s failure to meet its ﬁ  nancial obligations 
will cause other institutions to fail to meet theirs as 
well. In extreme cases, a ﬁ  nancial crisis could ensue, 
destabilizing capital markets and the real economy. 
Other risks are known as non-systemic. 
4|1 Non-systemic  risk
Many of the risks to which a hedge fund is exposed 
are speciﬁ  c to that fund. Risks such as operational 
risk and the risk of fraud directly affect a hedge 
fund’s investors and the banks lending to the 
fund. Regulators in many countries, especially the 
US and UK, have taken the approach that since 
the funds are restricted to large, sophisticated 
investors, it is these investors’ responsibility and 
not the government’s to perform due diligence 
on the funds in which they invest. Moreover, 
fraudulent operators are subject to prosecution 
under existing laws. 
In recent years, there have been numerous instances 
where hedge funds have lost hundreds of millions, or 
billions, of dollars (Table 2). Of 21 episodes reported 
in various public sources, two fund categories – 
ﬁ  xed income arbitrage and global macro – together 
accounted for 47% of the reported incidents and 
63% of assets lost (Charts 4), well above their 16% 
Table 2
Selected hedge fund disasters and large losses
(Estimated loss in USD millions)
Fund Strategy Year Estimated loss What went wrong?
Amaranth Multistrategy 2006 ~6,400 Excessive exposure to energy prices
Long-Term Capital Management Fixed-income arbitrage 1998 3,600 Excess leverage during Russian default crisis
Tiger Management Macro 2000 2,600 Bad bet on yen lost USD 2 billion
Soros Fund Macro 2000 2,000
-5,000
Major losses on Internet and technology stocks
Fenchurch Capital Fixed-income arbitrage 1995 1,264 Failed shift from US - only to European markets
Princeton Economics Inter’l Macro 1999 950 Market losses, fraud
Vairocana Ltd. Fixed-income arbitrage 1994 700 Market losses, bet on falling rates
Lipper Convertible arbitrage 2001 700 Market losses, fraud
Askin Capital Management Fixed-income arbitrage 
(mortgage-backed)
1994 660 Failed hedge, market losses, margin calls
Lancer Long/short  equity 2003 600 Fraud
Beacon Fixed income arbitrage 2002 500 Losses on mortgage derivatives, failed to mark
to market
Manhattan Investment Fund Long/short equity 1999 400 Fraud
MotherRock Energy Fund 2006 230 Loss from natural gas market
Global Systems Fund Macro 1997 125 Wiped out by collapse of Thai baht
Argonaut Capital Management Macro 1994 110 Market losses
Maricopa Investment Long/short equity 2000 59 Market losses, fraud
Cambridge Partners Long/short equity 2000 45 Fraud
HL Gestion/Volter Managed futures 2000 40 Market losses, regulatory intervention
Ashbury Capital Partners Long/short equity 2001 40 Fraud
ETJ Partners Relative value 2001 21 Market losses, fraud
Ballybunion Capital Long/short equity 2000 7 Fraud
Sources: Alexander Ineichen, UBS Warburg (2001): “The Myth of hedge funds: are hedge funds the ﬁ  reﬂ  ies ahead of the storm?”, Journal of Global Financial Markets, 
2(4),p. 34-46; Jeff Joseph Rydex Capital, “Investing in a hedge fund of funds: what really matters,” Senior Consultant, 7(8), p.1; Berkshire Asset Management winter, 
“Hedge Funds”, July 2003; New York Times, September 2006; Swiss Re Economic Research & Consulting.ARTICLES
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combined share of assets (Chart 2). This is consistent 
with ﬁ  ndings that these two strategies have among the 
highest attrition rates in the hedge fund universe.10
Forty-three percent of the 21 cases were fraud-related.
4|2 Systemic  risk
Systemic risk has traditionally been more of a 
concern to regulators than non-systemic risk.
As hedge funds have become more signiﬁ  cant 
ﬁ   nancial market participants, policymakers 
have raised concerns that they may contribute 
to systemic risk. One way this might occur is 
if a failing hedge fund causes the collapse of a 
large ﬁ   nancial institution with direct exposure 
to it. This could, in turn, cause further ﬁ  nancial 
system disruption. During the collapse of LTCM 
in the autumn of 1998, 17 counterparties, mostly 
large banks, would collectively have lost between
USD 3 and 5 billion had LTCM not been bailed 
out by a group of its counterparties. Many of the 
counterparties had direct exposure to LTCM, mostly 
arising from over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.11
The LTCM crisis illustrates why market turmoil 
can be averted even when a fund with extensive 
counterparty risk exposures fails. First, counterparties 
should recognize that they are at risk and act in 
their self-interest by interceding, as occurred in the 
LTCM episode. Second, banks’ risk management 
procedures with regard to individual exposures 
might prove highly effective, as was the case 
during the LTCM crisis. The replacement value of 
instruments net of collateral was a small percentage 
of banks’ overall trading portfolio, though it would 
have signiﬁ  cantly reduced their surplus capital. 
Banks’ risk management was, however, lacking in 
one regard: in assessing the risk of lending to LTCM, 
the banks relied too heavily on the reputations
of the fund’s partners but lacked a clear picture
of the fund’s overall risk proﬁ  le.12
Aside from causing the failure of a major 
counterparty, a failing hedge fund can disrupt the 
ﬁ   nancial markets indirectly. Timothy Geithner, 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Charts 4























10 Chan  (N.)  et al: “Systemic risk and hedge funds”, forthcoming in M. Carey and R. Stulz, eds., “The risks of ﬁ  nancial institutions and the ﬁ  nancial sector”. 
11  Petit (J.P.), Exane Economics Research, 23 June 2004, p. 9. LTCM had total trading assets of USD 125 billion, and notional off-balance sheet positions of 
over US 1 trillion. US commercial banks only had loans outstanding to LTCM of USD 170 million and equity investments of USD 900 million, according to
Meyer (L.), Testimony before the US House of Representatives, 24 March 1999.
12  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999): “Banks’ interactions with highly leveraged institutions”, January.ARTICLES
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characterizes the common dynamic of past ﬁ  nancial 
crises as:
• the conﬂ  uence of a sharp increase in risk perception, 
and the subsequent actions taken by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and investors to limit their exposure to 
future losses. As asset prices declined and volatility 
increased in response to increased concern about risk, 
ﬁ  rms moved to call margin, to reduce positions and to 
hedge against further losses. These individual actions 
had the aggregate effect of inducing even larger 
price declines and further heightening perceptions
of risk, ultimately propagating and amplifying the 
effects of the initial shock.13
In the wake of LTCM, the Basle Committee found 
that the potential to disrupt markets indirectly was 
of greater concern than the possibility of having a 
direct impact on ﬁ  nancial institutions.
The Committee identiﬁ   ed several reasons why 
hedge funds pose a risk to ﬁ  nancial markets:
• because of their use of leverage, hedge funds might 
exacerbate market movements if they are forced to 
sell securities to meet margin calls;
• forced selling might be additionally exacerbated by 
that fact that hedge funds often take similar positions 
and often invest in more illiquid securities;
•  the disruption could be further aggravated
if broker-dealers making margin calls front-run the 
hedge funds;
• many hedge funds are short-lived. Their historical 
attrition rate has been about 10% per year.14
This short time horizon may lead to increased
risk-taking since investment strategies will be 
focused on short-term gains. 
These factors combined to cause substantial ﬁ  nancial 
market disruption in the autumn of 1998 during the 
downfall of LTCM. Unlike the case of LTCM, however, 
other large-scale hedge fund losses have had little or 
no systemic impacts.
Amaranth, a highly regarded USD 9 billion
multi-strategy fund, recently lost 65% of its 
assets in less than two weeks. The fund lost 35%
of its value during the week of 11 September 2006
employing a highly leveraged natural gas spread 
strategy. Amaranth tried unsuccessfully to 
sell its positions to other ﬁ  nancial institutions 
over the week-end of 16-17 September.
On Wednesday, 20 September, it sold its positions 
to JP Morgan Chase and Citadel Investment 
Group at a USD 1.4 billion discount from the prior
day’s market-to-market values.15
The losses, though unnerving for market 
participants, posed little systemic risk because 
they occurred in a relatively small and isolated 
market. LTCM’s problems, by contrast, played out 
in the US Treasuries market. Amaranth and LTCM 
were both undermined when pursuing strategies 
that could conceivably have been proﬁ  table under 
certain scenarios. In each case, the failure was one 
of risk management. The trades were undertaken 
at such a large scale that when the markets moved 
against them, the funds were unable to exit their 
positions without moving the markets. A greater 
sensitivity to this liquidity risk, as well as a more 
thorough analysis of extreme scenarios, could 
have helped prevent these debacles. Amaranth 
demonstrates that a hedge fund can experience
large-scale failure without causing systemic risk.
The Tiger and Soros funds offer further examples
of large-scale losses with no systemic impact. 
The Tiger funds, which earned a 32% annualized 
return after fees from 1980 to 1998, ran into 
problems with a yen trade that lost USD 2 billion 
in 1998. Tiger suffered further losses due to a bear 
market in value stocks. As investors rushed to buy 
Internet, technology and telecom stocks in the late 
1990s, Tiger’s old economy holdings languished. 
Fund manager Julian Robertson announced the 
liquidation of the funds on 30 March 2000. The 
Soros funds, meanwhile, suffered the opposite 
fate. The funds reportedly lost billions of dollars in 
March and April of 2000 by joining the “New Age” 
bubble at precisely the wrong time.16
13  “Hedge funds and derivatives and their implications for the ﬁ  nancial system”, remarks at the 2006 Distinguished Lecture, sponsored by the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority and the Hong Kong Association of Banks. 
14 Chan  et al.
15  Till (H.), “EDHEC comments on the Amaranth case: early lessons from the debacle”, Working Paper, EDHEC Business School.
16  Robertson (J.), letter to investors, 30 March 2000. “Millionaire speculator Soros exiting risk business”, New York Times web edition, 28 April 2000.ARTICLES
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4|3  Causes for comfort
  about systemic risk
Although hedge funds can and do fail, sometimes 
spectacularly, these failures have generally not 
entailed systemic risk. There are other causes for 
comfort as well. 
Market practices have improved since the LTCM 
crisis. The banking system is cushioned by more 
risk-adjusted capital. In the US, for instance,
tier-one risk-based capital ratios have stabilized at 
about 8.5%, well above the 6.5% levels that prevailed 
in the early 1990s.17
Hedge fund risk management has improved through 
the efforts of bank supervisors, banks and securities 
ﬁ  rms; the involvement of institutional investors; and 
the institutionalization of hedge funds.
• Bank supervisors have promoted best practices in 
risk management among the banks that lend money 
to hedge funds. The banks have in turn promoted 
better risk management at the funds.
• After the LTCM episode, risk managers at banks 
and securities houses formed the Counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group, which developed 
recommendations and diligently implemented 
them.
• As institutional investors have increased their 
allocations to hedge funds, the question of hedge 
fund risk management has come increasingly to the 
fore. A recent survey of hedge fund investors found 
that sound risk management is now among their 
chief concerns.18
• The emergence of larger, more “institutional”, 
hedge funds has better aligned the interests of hedge 
fund managers with their investors.
There is some evidence that the role of hedge 
funds in ﬁ   nancial crises has been exaggerated. 
Many funds use no leverage, and most use very 
little.  According to a August 2005 report by service 
provider Van Hedge Fund Advisors, approximately 
20% of hedge funds used no leverage while 50% 
used leverage (borrowed money) of less than 1-to-1 
(including short positions as leverage). 
In many cases of market disruption, such as the 
Mexican and Asian currency crises, hedge funds 
were not a leading cause of problems. Research 
on the role that hedge funds and foreign investors 
played in Malaysian currency markets and the 
Korea stock market during these countries’ crises 
found no support for the theory that hedge funds 
were a major cause of these debacles.19 Similarly, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found 
no evidence of hedge funds abnormally proﬁ  ting 
from the Brazilian (1999), Turkish (2001), and 
Argentine (2001) currency crises.20 Rather than 
driving these currencies downwards, funds were 
engaged in negative feedback trading (i.e. buying on 
dips), which might actually have improved market 
liquidity and stability.
Finally, though market participants should not grow 
complacent, the absence of major systemic crises in 
the US since 1998 is an encouraging sign that risk 
management has improved. During that time, the 
US ﬁ  nancial infrastructure has weathered challenges 
including a major bear market and operations 
failures due to 9/11 without major systemic fallout. 
4|4  Three causes for concern
Mechanisms through which hedge funds can create 
systemic risk include style convergence, multiple 
layers of leverage and proprietary trading activities 
by banks.
One major concern is the possibility of many 
hedge funds with similar models and trading 
styles disrupting markets by trading in a similar 
fashion, leading them to start selling at the same 
time after some trigger.  Fung and Hsieh (2000) 
found evidence of “style convergence”, through 
which funds can arrive at similar trades, possibly
for different reasons.21
17  Geithner, op cit.
18  Deutsche Bank (2007): “2006 Alterative investment survey”, January.
19  Fox (J.) (1998): “Did foreign investors cause Asian market problem?” NBER Digest, October.
20  International Monetary Fund (2004): “Hedge funds and recent emerging market currency crises”, Global Financial Stability Report, p. 146-148, April.
21  Fung (W.) and Hsieh (D.) (2000): “Measuring the market impact of hedge funds”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 7, p. 1-36.ARTICLES
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The impact of this herding could be ampliﬁ  ed by the 
layers of leverage employed. Of particular concern is 
the practice of investors borrowing to invest in funds 
of funds or other hedge fund vehicles, funds of funds 
then borrowing to invest in hedge funds and hedge 
funds then borrowing and using derivatives and other 
instruments to leverage themselves.22 This practice 
could make funds vulnerable to large-scale losses. 
This use of leverage is particularly problematic in 
that banks might aggravate ﬁ  nancial market distress 
by withdrawing liquidity during difﬁ  cult periods.23
Thus, multiple hedge fund failures could cause a 
cascade of margin calls, destabilizing markets. 
Non-linear, option-like models can explain much 
of hedge funds’ returns. Using this method, it was 
found that hedge funds have a signiﬁ  cant amount 
of systematic risk, that equity funds exhibited 
signiﬁ  cant positive beta exposure to equity markets 
with return distributions resembling short-put 
positions, and that the analysis was consistent 
with the popular view that hedge funds are “short 
volatility”.24 Selling volatility can be an extremely 
risky strategy with potentially large negative returns 
even with a dynamically-hedged delta-neutral 
position.25 Also, IMF research found that even 
“market neutral” or “relative value” trading strategies, 
which are long some securities and short others in 
the same asset class, can experience a sharp increase 
in risk at times of extreme returns and often have 
correlations with other asset classes. This higher 
risk can occur even when holding a large number 
of “uncorrelated positions,” a common hedge fund 
risk management technique, because these positions 
can suddenly become correlated during periods
of market stress.26
Proprietary trading desks at major banks, which 
engage in trading strategies similar to those of hedge 
funds, are growing in size and importance. In each 
year from 2003 to 2005, NYSE member ﬁ  rms earned 
more revenues from trading than from equity 
commissions. In the ﬁ  rst nine months of 2006, 
they earned twice as much revenues from trading 
as from equity commissions.27
5| POTENTIAL BENEFITS
AND RISKS FOR INSURERS
Some insurers have found hedge funds to be 
worthwhile investments. At year-end 2006, insurers 
had an estimated USD 40 billion invested in hedge 
funds.28 Conversely, hedge funds have invested in 
insurance risk. These investments lead to a broader 
spread of risk. 
Insurers have several types of exposure to hedge 
fund failure. These include counterparty risk, credit 
risk, ﬁ  duciary liability insurance risk, and directors 
and ofﬁ  cers insurance risk to corporations with 
pension funds signiﬁ  cantly invested in hedge funds. 
Some insurers have exposure to broker-dealers, 
whose large proprietary trading and prime brokerage 
operations are subject to hedge fund-type risk.
6| REGULATORY OUTLOOK
Many regulators in the US and other major markets 
believe that regulating hedge funds indirectly 
through their sources of funds is the best way to 
monitor hedge fund activity and its impact on 
ﬁ  nancial markets. Securities and banking regulators 
oversee the relationships of hedge funds with the 
commercial banks and broker-dealers that lend to 
and transact with hedge funds. Banks must regularly 
assess the creditworthiness of their hedge fund 
borrowers and counterparties. Brokers must actively 
monitor the positions of hedge funds and manage 
their exposure to them. Regulators have reached 
no international consensus on the need for further 
oversight. Whereas many US and British regulators 
22  Bank of England (2004): “The ﬁ  nancial stability conjecture and outlook”, Financial Stability Review, June, p. 53.
23  Warwick (B.) (2004): “At the margins: leveraged level of funds of funds has some concerned”, MAR/Strategies, March, p. 9.
24  Agarwal (V.) and Naik (N.) (2002): “Risks and portfolio decisions involving hedge funds”, Working Paper, July 17.
25  A delta-neutral position has zero exposure to small changes in the underlying asset price. Nandi (S.) and Waggoner (D.), “The risks and rewards of selling volatility”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, First Quarter 2001, p. 31-39.
26  Richards (A.) (1999): “Idiosyncratic risk: an empirical analysis, with implications for the risk of relative-value trading strategies,” IMF Working Paper, No. 99/148, 
November. Research suggests that hedge funds avoided the worst of the recent stock market downturn because they were able to time their investments by selling 
tech stocks before, during, and after the stock market started to collapse. Source: Brunnermeier (M.) and Nagel (S.) (2002): “Arbitrage at its limits: hedge funds and 
the technology bubble,” Working Paper, August.
27  Fernandez (F.A.) (2006): “US securities industry 3Q’06 results”, SIFMA Research Report, 13 December, p.46.
28  The Deutsche Bank survey states that insurers account for 3% of hedge fund investments which, as noted above, total about USD 1.4 trillion.ARTICLES
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are reluctant to create new hedge fund regulations, 
ofﬁ  cials in many European countries seek fuller 
disclosure or a ratings system for the funds.29
In December 2004, the SEC adopted a rule requiring 
hedge funds to register as investment advisors, 
thereby allowing regulators to examine hedge 
funds’ accounts and records. The reasons it cited 
for the rule were the growth of the hedge fund 
industry, an increase in the number of fraud cases 
and a growing number of hedge funds investors 
with no previous experience investing in the funds.
In June 2006, the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded 
the rule. It is uncertain how much impact a 
registration requirement would have. Hedge 
funds could move offshore to avoid registering. 
Moreover, because of its resource limitations, 
the Commission might ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to closely 
monitor the industry.
• Hedge funds have grown rapidly, from USD 39 billion in assets in 1990 to USD 1.4 trillion in assets
at the end of the third quarter of 2006.
• Because many hedge funds trade rapidly and employ leverage, their activities have a disproportionately 
large impact on capital markets.
• Hedge funds provide beneﬁ  ts to investors and improve risk sharing and ﬁ  nancial market stability.
• Regulators have generally taken the position that the sophisticated investors who buy hedge fund shares 
can fend for themselves. Fraudulent fund manager behavior is, however, prosecutable. 
• The risk of hedge funds causing the downfall of a large ﬁ  nancial institution is low.
• Due to the changing nature of funds’ exposure to asset markets, it is difﬁ  cult to know when a hedge 
fund’s distress might cause a shock. Of the numerous large-scale hedge fund losses that have occurred, 
few have posed systemic risks. 
• In recent years, hedge fund risk management has improved due to the efforts of regulators, banks
and securities ﬁ  rms; the preferences of institutional investors; and the institutionalization of hedge funds. 
• Hedge funds could cause ﬁ  nancial market disruption due to the use of similar trading strategies, layers 
of leverage and proprietary trading by banks.
• In many instances, hedge funds provide liquidity and stability to ﬁ  nancial markets, propping up the prices 
of assets whose values have declined sharply. 
• On balance, hedge funds likely reduce systemic risk.
29 Scannell  (K.)  et al ( 2007): “No consensus on regulating hedge funds”, Wall Street Journal, 5 January, p. C1.